Existing research suggests that communities can successfully govern common-pool resources, ensuring long-term viability of the resource. However, little research has been done to evaluate the potential of positive spillovers of these forms of local cooperation. To what extent does participation in common-pool resource management regimes (CPRs) yield spillover effects into other spheres of behavior, influencing individual behavior beyond the realm of natural resource management? This question is of particular importance, given that international aid agencies have begun implementing CPRs in an attempt to build peace, though there is limited academic work to support this assumed effect. In this paper, I explore the theoretical potential of spillover effects of common property rights regimes at the community level. Specifically, I develop a theory specifying how participation in common property regimes affects the likelihood that members of those communities join a rebel movement, support rebels, or take up arms to defend the community and common-pool resource they manage. I also propose a context and methodological framework in which to test these hypotheses.