Many recent cases of politically motivated lawbreaking include instances of property damage and/or destruction (e.g., political “vandalism,” “looting,” sabotage, etc.). Despite their importance for contemporary protest politics, many scholars either sideline them or group them under broad conceptual rubrics (e.g., “resistance,” “uncivil disobedience”). In the process, they fail to capture key empirical distinctions and identify the resulting normative-political challenges. I offer a more nuanced, empirically useful account of politically motivated property damage’s various forms. Only with the appropriate typology in hand can we fruitfully tackle the tough challenges it poses. I address key political-theoretical and social-philosophical questions, most importantly: when and why should specific political acts resulting in property damage be viewed as having, in principle, some potentially “acceptable” normative and political status? To do so, I explore some closely related questions. When, if ever, does it make sense to describe political property damage as “violent”? What might our answer to that question entail for those committed to political nonviolence? How might different views of property help us make sense not only of political property damage’s types, but also how to evaluate, as a normative-political matter, their possible merits and demerits?